Turkey and the gender policies of Erdogan's AKP party: the role of the European Union

Gender Paradigms and Their Evolution in Turkey

The gender paradigms and their evolution in Turkey must be analyzed through a historical approach, since this method allows us to understand the broader political dynamics within which gender relations are embedded and through which the role of women has been shaped.

Contents

• The Historical Context

• The Two Phases of AKP Government

• The Influence of the European Union on the Gender Agenda

• The Authoritarian Turn

• The Tools of Anti-Gender Narrative

The Historical Context

There is a stark contrast between the period of Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Turkish state, and that of Erdoğan. Atatürk needed women to embody the discourse around one of the pillars on which modern Turkey was built: modernization and Westernization.Under Erdoğan, however, starting in 2015, the government began expressing its regressive vision of gender relations, centered on the reinforcement of traditional roles.

During the Republican period, the changes that took place were part of the first wave of feminism internationally; women were used as symbols of change and Westernization. Legislative reforms and the introduction of women into the public sphere were implemented from a male perspective and were directed only toward those women who embodied the Kemalist ideal of the modern Turkish woman.

The ideal of equality between men and women, promoted during Turkey’s modernization, never fully materialized. The political leadership ensured that women’s presence in the public sphere remained symbolic and did not translate into political participation or integration into the workforce. In essence, it was a transition from Ottoman patriarchal structures to Turkish ones.

The second wave of feminism arrived in Turkey late, following the 1980 coup d’état. It can be summarized by the slogan “the personal is political.” For the first time, women themselves began demanding change—on issues such as sexuality, violence against women, and the wearing of the headscarf.

The third wave of Turkish feminism, which began in the 1990s, was closely linked to identity politics. As Turkey considered possible accession to the European Union, women’s groups from diverse backgrounds—such as Kurdish and Islamist women—pressed to ensure that their interests were included in the adoption of the acquis communautaire.

The European Union supported civil society by funding programs that encouraged bottom-up participation, leading to a proliferation of women’s associations and NGOs.

The Two Phases of AKP Government

The AKP’s time in power can be divided into two distinct phases:

1. 2002–2011, marked by strong engagement with civil society, which the AKP portrayed itself as representing;

2. 2011–present, characterized by a reversal and a shift in rhetoric.

   
   

In its first two terms, the AKP, describing itself as conservative-democratic, acted more like a center-right rather than a far-right populist party. It represented the conservative Islamic electorate without alienating other voters, in a context of gradual democratization enabled by the EU accession process.

Between 2011 and 2015, however, the party transformed into a national-populist force, creating an authoritarian electoral system through the imposition of a new constitution. After obtaining 50% of the vote in the 2011 elections, European membership ambitions disappeared from the AKP’s political agenda.

This periodization of AKP governance is also reflected in its gender policies. During the first phase, the party implemented gender equality measures in line with EU requirements. Notable legal reforms—often in collaboration with a vibrant feminist movement—included Law No. 6284 against domestic violence (introduced after an alarming rise in cases in 2007) and the signing of the Istanbul Convention.

However, in the second phase, there was increasing Islamization of policies that reinforced women’s roles as mothers and wives through a family-centered welfare system. For the AKP’s neoliberal agenda, the family became an ally of the state.

A telling example is the Conditional Cash Transfer Program, launched in 2003, which provided subsidies to mothers for children’s education and healthcare. This effectively shifted social security responsibilities from the state to the family—and particularly to women. As a result, women performing care work were encouraged to stay at home and discouraged from joining the labor force.

The Influence of the European Union on the Gender Agenda

The gender policies pursued by the AKP in its first period were consistent with the EU accession process that began after the Helsinki Summit. Thus, EU conditions were a driving force behind many of the changes in gender policy, alongside pressure from post-1980 Turkish feminist movements.

An example is the Reproductive Health Program, launched in 2003 and financed by the EU. It addressed not only maternity and family planning but also sexually transmitted diseases, and targeted not just married women—marking a significant step forward for sexual freedom.

Other key progress included the amendment of the Penal Code: previously, sexual crimes were defined as offenses against social, familial, and moral order, since women’s bodies and sexuality were seen as property of their husbands and society. The new law redefined sexual crimes as offenses against individuals, criminalizing marital rape and virginity testing.

Another important step was the creation of women’s shelters, signaling official recognition of domestic violence as a political issue.

The Authoritarian Turn

After the 2015 elections—when the pro-Kurdish HDP achieved an electoral success that stripped the ruling party of its parliamentary majority—the AKP faced, for the first time, a popular-democratic coalition that challenged its populist narrative. The party responded with a wave of authoritarianism, further intensified by the failed 2016 coup attempt by the Gülen movement.

Turkey’s increasingly confrontational stance toward the EU—exacerbated by the refugee crisis and the declaration of a state of emergency—deeply affected gender policies. The government began expressing its regressive vision of gender relations more openly, with support from political and academic circles, weakening EU-aligned gender initiatives.

For instance, feminist organizations were excluded from the monitoring committee of the Istanbul Convention, which was composed solely of groups approved by the government.

There is a strong link between the AKP’s authoritarian shift and the weakening of women’s rights protection. The party does not tolerate dissenting opinions, and in this context, feminist movements are seen as a threat—having successfully organized despite internal diversity to achieve reforms such as changes to the Civil and Penal Codes (in 2001 and 2005).

The Gezi Park protests in 2013 demonstrated the vitality of women’s and LGBTQ+ movements, to which Erdoğan responded with an Islamic-populist narrative laden with alarmist and moralistic tones on gender issues.

The Tools of Anti-Gender Narrative

Erdoğan’s new narrative is built on a dichotomy: the virtuous, veiled, chaste Anatolian mother of martyrs versus rebellious, sexually active, and immoral women—portrayed as internal enemies tied to foreign powers. The more women assert their rights, the more violent and misogynistic men’s reactions become.

A crucial tool in reinforcing this image has been the media and public discourse, aimed at aligning public perception with the political authorities’ vision.

Speeches urging women to have more children, limit abortions, marry early, and dress modestly are echoed by leaders of religious orders and theology professors.

The AKP also relies on government-aligned civil society organizations such as KADEM (Women and Democracy Association, founded by Erdoğan’s daughter) and TÜRGEV (Youth and Education Service Foundation). These have been described as “government-organized non-governmental organizations”—meaning they serve the state rather than operate independently.

Meanwhile, independent women’s organizations have been denied funding and excluded from international events like the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).

KADEM’s main goal is to promote traditional values among Turkish women, replacing the concept of gender equality with gender justice. The notion of gender justice, rooted in Islamic values, emphasizes the natural differences between the sexes: men are responsible for providing and protecting the family, while women are tasked with caring for children and domestic duties.

KADEM’s president argues that this framework allows recognition of differences between and among men and women—differences that egalitarian feminism allegedly ignored. Yet this concept of immutable, “natural” roles paves the way for legitimizing family-based divisions of labor and women’s subordination as mothers and wives, preserving patriarchal structures.

Erdoğan has also stated:

“I do not believe in equality between men and women. I believe in equal opportunities. Men and women are different and complementary.”“You cannot put men and women in the same position because that contradicts creation.”

This forms the social pact the AKP has struck with women—who make up over 55% of its electorate: adherence to traditional gender norms, domestic obedience, and political loyalty in exchange for social welfare, employment for men, and thus family security.

In Summary

To understand gender relations in Turkey, it is essential to analyze the international context and underlying power structures.

As shown, the normative models of women’s roles since the early Republic were shaped by strategic and identity-driven needs. Top-down legal reforms, while improving women’s conditions, ultimately reinforced existing patriarchal structures, limiting women’s advancement beyond boundaries set by the ruling elite.

Only after 1980 did Turkish feminism begin to articulate the real needs of women.

During the AKP period influenced by the EU—when integration seemed plausible—significant reforms were adopted to promote women’s freedom and protection from violence and sexual abuse. Yet, neoliberal imperatives simultaneously imposed new burdens that discouraged women’s professional participation.

To borrow a concept from U.S. historian Joan Scott, the perceived differences between genders at any historical moment serve as a tool to give meaning to other power relations. In Turkey, the AKP’s conservative stance corresponds to the authoritarian phase inaugurated after the HDP’s electoral success.

A new narrative emerged—drawing on the legitimizing power of religion—based on an essentialist differentiation between men and women that profoundly impacts the social order.

This framework helps us understand the political and social processes—affecting both the ruling party and civil society—that ultimately led to Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on July 1, 2021.

Thank you for reading.

See you soon,

Ylenia

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